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Spinoza and the Dutch 
Cartesians on Philosophy 
and Theology
A L E X A N D E R  D O U G L A S *
1 .  i n t r o d u c t i o n
in this paper i aim to place Spinoza’s famous injunction in the Tractatus 
Theologico-Politicus, to separate philosophy from theology, in its historical context. 
I contend that in order to properly understand Spinoza’s views concerning the 
relationship between philosophy and theology, we must view his work in the con-
text of philosophical discussions taking place during his time and in his country 
of residence, the Dutch Republic. Of particular relevance is a meta-philosophical 
thesis advocated by a certain group of Cartesian philosophers and theologians. 
Their thesis was developed in response to attacks on Cartesianism from more 
conservative authors, who saw it as a source of impiety. It stated that Cartesian 
philosophy, properly understood, is neither pious nor impious. It cannot help to 
answer questions about theology, nor can it provide knowledge of any relevance 
to advancing human wellbeing and salvation.
Theo Verbeek has already argued that understanding this “Dutch Cartesian” 
thesis is relevant to understanding important features of Spinoza’s thought.1 I build 
upon his work to argue that Spinoza’s views concerning religion and philosophy 
should be understood as a conscious repudiation of it. The Dutch Cartesians genu-
inely hoped to separate philosophy from theology. Spinoza similarly claimed to 
separate them, but he meant far less by this separation than the Dutch Cartesians 
had meant. He held that what separates theology from philosophy is a difference 
in the goals they pursue. And yet he strongly implied that the distinctive aim of 
* Alexander Douglas is a Jacobsen Fellow at the Institute of Philosophy, School of Advanced 
Studies, and King’s College, London.
1 See Verbeek, “Les Cartésiens face à Spinoza: l’Exemple de Johannes de Raey,” “Spinoza and 
Cartesianism,” “Spinoza et la tradition des Analytiques Postérieures,” “Spinoza on the Truth and 
Certainty of Scientific Knowledge,” Spinoza’s Theologico-Political Treatise: Exploring ‘the Will of God’, esp. 
ch.6, “Wittich’s Critique of Spinoza.”
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theology, as he defined it, could in certain cases be ultimately advanced by means 
of philosophy alone. 
On the other hand, Spinoza’s expressions of belief in the separation between 
theology and philosophy were not disingenuous, as a comparison between his views 
and those of Meijer will show. Indeed his position on this issue could be said to be 
somewhere between that of the Dutch Cartesians and that of Meijer.
2 .  t h e  d u t c h  c a r t e s i a n s
Philosophy inspired by the new methods and theories of Descartes enjoyed a 
period of popularity in the Dutch Republic from the 1640s until the end of the 
century, when Newtonian and Lockean ideas began to take over.2 Interpretations 
of Cartesian philosophy varied widely. Verbeek identifies at least three distinct 
Dutch Cartesian schools, all emphasizing different parts of Descartes’s thought.3 
The Cartesian school I shall focus on in this paper is the one that was most toler-
ated by officials within the universities. It was sustained by what Verbeek calls a 
“network of Cartesians”:
Those who belonged to this network were, first of all, [Abraham] Heidanus, [Jo-
hannes] De Raey, Johannes Clauberg and Christopher Wittich, Lambert van Velthuy-
sen, and a theological student, Frans Burman. They all knew each other and were 
bound by enthusiasm for Descartes’s philosophy and by strong feelings of loyalty 
toward its author and each other.4
All the members of this network (with the exception of Velthuysen)5 were professors 
of philosophy, theology, and related subjects at universities in Leiden, Amsterdam, 
and elsewhere in and around the Dutch Republic. 
What made, or was at least intended to make, this network’s version of Cartesian 
philosophy more acceptable to the university authorities than other versions was 
the claim that it had no relevance whatsoever to what were known as the “higher 
faculties.” These included theology, law, medicine, and other sciences directly 
concerned with questions of human conduct and welfare. Universities in this 
period, in the Dutch Republic as elsewhere in Europe, were increasingly becom-
ing places of training for lawyers, doctors, church ministers, and members of the 
rapidly-growing government bureaucracy.6 Philosophy had traditionally been 
taught as an introduction to general ways of thinking, before students moved on 
to study in the higher faculties and receive specific training for their professional 
roles.7 Thus many saw in the new Cartesian philosophy a threat that was social as 
well as intellectual. 
2 See C. De Pater, “Experimental Physics”; Ruestow, Physics at Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century 
Leiden, 88–90; Thijssen-Schoute, Nederlands Cartesianisme; Verbeek, Descartes and the Dutch.
3 Verbeek, Spinoza’s Theologico-Political Treatise, 151–52.
4 Verbeek, Descartes and the Dutch, 70.
5 He, born into a fairly privileged social position, was a full-time amateur theologian and philoso-
pher, who had abandoned medical practice for which he had been trained at Utrecht University. He also, 
at times, diverged from the aims and programs of the Dutch Cartesian network (see below, note 51).
6 “Looking over Europe as a whole, . . .  the universities can be seen to have . . .  turned out, year 
after year, the administrative elite of both Church and state; an elite, be it said, on which both these 
institutions relied successfully for their continuity though the revolutions of the mid-seventeenth 
century” (Kamen, The Iron Century, 319).
7 Verbeek, Descartes and the Dutch, 6n28.
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To combat this perception, the network of Dutch Cartesians (henceforth simply 
‘the Dutch Cartesians’) worked together to argue that it is a misguided policy to 
teach philosophy as an introduction to the higher faculties. It is only a mistaken 
conception of philosophy that leads one to think that it has any relevance to them. 
Cartesianism corrects this misconception. Far from being practically corrupting, 
it aspires to make philosophy practically irrelevant. Thus the Dutch Cartesians’ 
unofficial leader, De Raey, wrote in a 1687 disputation on “Modesty and Prudence 
in Philosophizing” that “the less Theology, Jurisprudence, Medicine, and other 
such arts, are known by philosophy, that is to say, the less connected they are to 
it, the more excellent and true philosophy is.”8 In an earlier 1665 disputation, he 
complained that “the Philosophy of the Schools” had corrupted all the sciences 
by failing to keep practical disciplines separate from philosophy.9
To understand why the Dutch Cartesians were keen to make this point, we 
must examine the specific criticisms made against Cartesianism by powerful fig-
ures within both the university administrations and the Reformed Church. One 
figure who was extremely powerful within both establishments was the minister, 
professor of theology, and rector of Utrecht University, Gisbertus Voetius.10 In his 
Disputations Concerning Atheism, published in 1648 and revised a number of times 
subsequently,11 Voetius warned against the danger Cartesian philosophy posed to 
practical religion. Without calling the Cartesians by name, but clearly intending 
them,12 he attacked all those who tried to use a method of doubt to deprive people 
of their ordinary understanding of nature, in a manner that would eventually cast 
doubt on their religious beliefs as well.13 This, he warned, could lead only to the 
spread of impiety:
For as there is no practice which does not presuppose knowledge, and no knowl-
edge which may not be directed towards some practical end; so there is no practical 
atheism which does not presuppose some corruption of theory or of the judgment 
of the mind, and no speculative atheism which does not proceed to the corruption 
of practice; for in this they are mutual causes, as indeed will and intellect are in all 
other things.14
One key issue was the Cartesian attitude toward what Voetius called “Mosaic 
Physics.” This was a system of physics that he and others had developed, based on 
8 Theologiae, Jurisprudentiae, Medicinae, aliarumque artium, tanto minorem cum philosophia congitionem, 
sive connexionem esse, quanto sublimior & magis vera philosophia est . . . (“Disputatio Philosophica; Speci-
men exhibens Modestiae et Prudentiae in Philosophando” in Raei, Cogitata de Interpretatione, 653).
9 Raei, Cogitata, 651; see Verbeek, “Tradition and Novelty: Descartes and some Cartesians,” 191.
10 1589–1676.
11 Bizer, “Reformed Orthodoxy and Cartesianism,” 27n44, 36n80. 
12 He could not call them by name, since a 1642 resolution passed by his own university senate 
prohibited the explicit discussion of any philosophy besides that of Aristotle. This placed him and 
others in the difficult position of refuting Cartesianism without explicitly mentioning it (see Ruestow, 
Physics at Leiden, 36; Verbeek, Descartes and the Dutch, Ch.1.). 
13 Bizer, “Reformed Orthodoxy and Cartesianism,” 30; Voetius, Disputationes Theologicae Selectae, 
I.131–32. 
14 Ut enim nulla praxis est quæ non præsupponat cognitionem, & nulla cognitio quæ non ad utilitatem 
aliquam dirigi possit: Sic nullus est practicus Atheismus, qui non præsupponat aliquam corruptionem theoriæ seu 
judicii mentis; & nullus speculativus qui non procedat ad corruptionem praxeos; sunt enim sibi mutuo causæ; 
prout in aliis omnibus intellectus & voluntas (Voetius, Disputationes Theologicae Selectae, I.166).
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a combination of Aristotelianism and Biblical literalism.15 Cartesian physics was 
designed to replace this system, at least for philosophically minded people (the 
Dutch Cartesians admitted that the old system was perfectly sufficient for every-
day purposes).16 They argued that the very idea of Mosaic physics was based on a 
misunderstanding of the purpose of Scripture. Scripture is meant to teach moral 
lessons, not to serve as a physics textbook. Therefore it often speaks in an imprecise 
way, accommodated to the limited scientific understanding of most of its readers.17 
Thus, for example, Wittich declared himself “against those who wish to forge us a 
Physics which is Mosaic, sacred, Christian, etc.”18 But Voetius warned that people
who seem so little to value the Mosaic Physics of the Scriptures, dictated by the Holy 
Spirit, and prefer their own conceptions of nature and the universe, . . . such people 
as a consequence cast doubt on the divinity of Scripture and accuse the Holy Spirit 
of being foolish . . . and in this way they confirm atheism and unbelief.19
In this way Cartesian philosophy was said to lead directly to atheism: it makes 
us doubt the literal truth of Scripture, and this doubt becomes practically cor-
rupting. It leads to what Voetius called “practical atheism,” involving arrogance 
(thinking oneself cleverer than the Holy Spirit) and impiety (if the Holy Spirit 
is thought to speak foolishly concerning matters of physics, why take its moral 
injunctions seriously?).
Underlying these accusations was Voetius’s belief that philosophy and practi-
cal theology are interdependent sciences. Nor was this view peculiar to Voetius. A 
similar attitude in the theologian Samuel Maresius20 can be seen in his Theological 
Dissertation on the Surreptitious and Evasive Abuse of Theology and Faith by Cartesian 
Philosophy.21 Other orthodox Calvinist theologians such as Melchior Leydekker22 
made similar arguments.23 The physics professor, Arnold Senguerd, in his 1648 
15 A study of this system and its relation to Cartesianism can be found in Ruler, The Crisis of Causality.
16 Raei, Cogitata, 657.
17 Accommodationism was a well-established position within the Calvinist context, even before 
the rise of Cartesianism; see Calvin’s own comments about Scripture (Calvini, In primum Mosis librum, 
qui Genesis vulgo dicitur, commentarius, I.15; English translation: A Commentary on Genesis). See also Har-
rison, The Bible, Protestantism, and the Rise of Natural Science, 133–38; Hooykaas, Religion and the Rise of 
Modern Science, 118; Verbeek, Descartes and the Dutch, 7. Wittich claimed that his way of reading Scripture 
was drawn from Scripture itself (Wittichius, Consensus Veritatis in Scriptura Divina revelatæ cum veritate 
Philosophica a Renato Descartes detecta, 19–21). Spinoza would make a similar claim about his own, very 
different, reading in the seventh chapter of his Tractatus Theologico-Politicus.
18 Wittichius, Consensus Veritatis, 16. Voetius and the Groningen theologian Samuel Maresius were 
almost certainly the implicit targets of this attack; see Bizer, “Reformed Orthodoxy and Cartesianism,” 
62–68.
19 [Q]ui Phisicam Mosaicam & scripturariam à Spir.S. dictatam tam parvi faciunt, ut suos conceptus de 
universo & rerum naturâ illi longè praeferre videantur . . . quique consequenter divinitatem scripturae labefac-
tant & Spir. S. Ineptiae . . . & sic manus atheorum & atque infidelium confirmant (Voetius, Disputationes 
Theologicae Selectae, I.177).
20 1599–1673.
21 Maresius, De Abusu Philosophiae Cartesianae, Surrepente et Vitando in Rebus Theologicis et Fidei, 
Dissertatio Theologica ; criticized in Wittichius, Theologia Pacifica, in qua varia problemata theologica inter 
reformatos theologos agitari solita ventilantur, simul usus philosophiae Cartesianae in diversis theologiae partibus 
demonstratur et ad dissertationem celeberrimi viri Samuelis Maresii modeste respondetur, Theologico Pacifica Defensa. 
22 1642–1721.
23 Bizer, “Reformed Orthodoxy and Cartesianism,” 76–77.
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inaugural address at the Illustrious School in Amsterdam, emphasized the strong 
links between piety and philosophy.24 All of these authors maintained the impos-
sibility of separating philosophical from theological concerns, and more generally 
theoretical from practical science.
To rebut the most serious charge against Cartesianism—that it leads to practical 
impiety—the Dutch Cartesians insisted that philosophy not only can but should 
be separated from theology. Indeed, they argued for a strict separation between 
philosophy and all the higher faculties, finding the seeds of this theory of separa-
tion in Descartes’s own writings.
Descartes had written, in the Principles of Philosophy, that his chief philosophical 
method—that of systematic doubt—should be used as a way of arriving at specu-
lative knowledge, but not at practical knowledge informing “ordinary life.”25 His 
outline of his philosophical method began with the proposal that “[w]hat is doubt-
ful should even be considered as false.”26 What is not doubtful turns out to be only 
what can be clearly and distinctly conceived.27 But it would be highly impractical, 
he implied, for us to employ such rigorous standards of knowledge when making 
our everyday life choices. Remarks like this were taken up and elaborated by the 
Dutch Cartesians into a full epistemological distinction between philosophy and 
the practical sciences.28 According to De Raey, philosophy does not seek truth 
simpliciter; it seeks a specific kind of truth, leaving the practical disciplines to seek 
another kind:
[T]he truth which Philosophy seeks differs greatly from that which we find in com-
mon life and in other disciplines. For the latter is, and should be, related to us as 
each thing is taken according to the senses, and considering the ways in which it is 
useful rather than harmful to life, which are diverse and even contrary. The other, 
by contrast, is, and should be, absolute and intrinsic, and moreover known solely by 
the intellect, which is always the same, as are its simple and primitive ideas, which 
we have seen to be very few.29
One important point is that philosophical knowledge is defined here as being 
known “solely by the intellect.” In a letter to Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia, Des-
cartes had suggested that things of leading relevance to the practical sciences—hu-
man passions and voluntary actions—can be clearly perceived by the senses, but 
only obscurely perceived “by the understanding alone [par l’entendement seul].”30 
24 Dibon, La philosophie néerlandaise au siècle d’or, 241.
25 Descartes, Principles of Philosophy, Part I, Article 3 (AT VIIIA.6/CSM I.193).
26 Principles I.2 (AT VIIIA.6/CSM I.193).
27 Principles I.43 (AT VIIIA.21/CSM I.207).
28 I shall not discuss whether this was really loyal to the spirit of Descartes, a vexed and complex 
question beyond the scope of this essay; but see Verbeek, “Tradition and Novelty.”
29 [V]eritas quam Philosophia quaerit multum ab ea differt, quam in communi vita & aliis disciplinis spec-
tamus. Haec enim ut est, sic quoque debet esse relata ad nos ut unumquodque habet se quod ad sensus & conside-
randi modos, in quibus multiplex diversitas & saepe etiam contrarietas est, quod non nocet sed utile est ad vitam. 
Illa ex adverso absoluta & intrinseca est & talis quoque debet esse; ideoque solo intellectu cognoscitur, qui semper 
idem & sibi similis est quod ad simplices & primitivas ideas quas etiam vidimus valde paucas esse (“Disputatio 
Philosophica; Specimen exhibens Modestiae et Prudentiae in Philosophando,” in Raei, Cogitata, 652).
30 Descartes to Elisabeth, 28 June 1643 (AT III.690–95/CSM III.226–29). According to Descartes, 
this is because such things pertain to “the union of soul and body,” and thus fall into a special category 
of primitive notions distinct from those with which philosophy is concerned. In another paper, yet 
unpublished, I go into much greater detail in comparing the position suggested in this letter with 
that of De Raey.
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Here one might assume that ‘the understanding’ means “the intellect,” and thus, 
on De Raey’s scheme, knowledge of such things should not be part of the truth 
sought by philosophy. The way to understand them, rather, is through applying 
the senses in everyday experience. De Raey echoed this sentiment in a dissertation 
on “vulgar and philosophical cognition.”31
De Raey noted that this latter kind of knowledge—“common experience” or 
“vulgar knowledge”—is polymorphous, combining “diverse modes and differ-
ent kinds of wisdom.”32 It is largely based on naïve observation, unmediated by 
philosophical theory.33 But it also has a historical component. In his lecture “On 
the Wisdom of the Ancients,” De Raey claimed that the study of older forms of 
philosophy produced by the ancients, including Aristotle, constitutes what he 
called “natural history” rather than natural philosophy.34 By this he meant that the 
wisdom of the ancients is a catalogue of convenient and useful beliefs, though not 
an index of true philosophical principles. Both in this lecture and in another,35 
De Raey suggested that the historical work of collecting and understanding these 
practically useful judgments is vital in the higher faculties, though it must be borne 
in mind that they do not embody philosophical truth.36
De Raey might have had in mind here the category of “moral certainty,” said by 
Descartes to apply to judgments that are “as certain as is necessary for the conduct 
of life.”37 But Descartes, unlike De Raey, did not seem to think the distinction be-
tween genuine and moral certainty lined up with that between philosophical and 
practical judgments; indeed, he pointed out that much of his physics—part of his 
philosophy—might be regarded as only morally certain.38 De Raey, by contrast, 
saw the distinction between genuine certainty and the lesser form as one criterion 
for demarcating philosophy from non-philosophy.
But in proposing this, De Raey did not mean to imply that common experience 
is always of an inferior order of certainty to philosophical knowledge. Some of 
it might be of a superior order. For another important part of common knowl-
edge, he held, is faith. Dogmas of faith are beyond the grasp of philosophy, but 
this is because they belong to a higher rather than a lower order of knowledge: 
“[T]hose truths held by faith from revelation cannot also be referred to philosophy, 
for those we have said to be above philosophy.”39
Sense-experience, the study of ancient wisdom, and faith were, then, the vari-
ous components of common experience according to De Raey. The higher facul-
31 AT III.692, “Dissertatio de Cognitione Vulgari & Philosophica,” in Raei, Cogitata, 348.
32 “Dissertatio de Cognitione Vulgari & Philosophica,” in Cogitata, 348.
33 “Dissertatio de Cognitione Vulgari & Philosophica,” in Cogitata, 360–61.
34 “De Sapientia Veterum,” in Cogitata, 381. Translation Verbeek, “Tradition and Novelty,” 191.
35 Raei, Cogitata, 453–90.
36 “De Aristotele et Aristotelicis,” in Cogitata, 471; translation: Verbeek, “Tradition and Novelty,” 193.
37 Principles IV.205 (AT VIIIA.327–28/CSM I.289–90). Spinoza refers to moral certainty (whether 
or not this is the same idea as that of Descartes) at various points, e.g. Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, 
30–33 (Gebhardt pagination). For a discussion of Spinoza’s notion of moral certainty, contrasted 
with the more general idea that was (perhaps) the one referred to by Descartes, see Verbeek, Spinoza’s 
Theologico-Political Treatise, 75–81.
38 Principles IV.205. (AT VIIIA.327–28/CSM I.289–90).
39 “Dissertatio de Cognitione Vulgari & Philosophica,” in Raei, Cogitata, 348–49. Descartes says 
things that imply this, for instance Principles I.24. (AT VIIIA.14/CSM I.201).
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ties, being based on these kinds of knowledge, were for him completely separate 
from philosophy.40 De Raey continued throughout his career to instruct the other 
members of his network in this line of thinking, as he recorded in a letter to Wit-
tich from 1680.41
This separation theory implies that all of the ideas necessary for the compre-
hension of non-philosophical subjects must come, at least partly, from a source 
outside of the intellect, since knowledge from the pure intellect pertains specially 
to philosophy.42 But Descartes had claimed that “we possess only two modes of 
thinking: the perception of the intellect and the operation of the will.”43 In mak-
ing its judgments, the will can either bind itself to the most certain perceptions 
of the intellect—the clear and distinct ideas upon which philosophy is based—or 
it can venture beyond them.44 De Raey’s view would be that when one does phi-
losophy, one binds one’s will to such perceptions, whereas in common life and in 
non-philosophical studies, one lets it range more freely. 
But when one lets the will range beyond clear and distinct perceptions, Des-
cartes had warned, we are prone to error.45 However, De Raey’s view seems to have 
been that the danger of error is either not present or not pressing in the case of 
practical, non-philosophical judgments. At any rate, it seems that his distinction 
between philosophical and non-philosophical judgment depends upon Descartes’s 
distinction between will and intellect. The importance of this will become clear 
further on in this discussion.
De Raey’s views were subject to many difficulties. He was much more interested 
than Descartes had been in the question of how practical science is possible—that 
is, systematic thinking on practical questions. He therefore had to say something 
about its appropriate methodology. Probably under the influence of Clauberg, 
he at one point recommended the use of Ramist methods.46 This was probably an 
appropriate choice, given how, as the Port Royal Logic put it,
40 “Disputatio Philosophica; Specimen exhibens Modestiae et Prudentiae in Philosophando,” in 
Cogitata, 653. 
41 Letter to Wittichius, 12 August 1680, in Cogitata, 660. The point about medicine is outside 
the scope of this paper, but is discussed in some detail in Verbeek, “Les Passions et la Fièvre: l’Idée 
de la Maladie chez Descartes et quelques Cartésiens Néerlandais.” The main reason not to include 
medicine within philosophy, for De Raey, was that again it does not depend only on the absolute ideas 
of the intellect. Verbeek links this point to Descartes’s correspondence with Elisabeth; see Verbeek, 
“Tradition and Novelty,” 195–96.
42 See note 29 above. De Raey did write to Wittich, at one point, that he believed the intellect to 
be two-fold, such that philosophy pertains to one of its sides, and the other disciplines pertain to the 
other ( . . .in uno homine duplicem inveniri intellectum . . .) (Raei, Cogitata, 656). But this does not sound 
very Cartesian and it does not square with what he usually says. Perhaps he is using the term ‘intellect’ 
here loosely, to refer to mental activities in general.
43 Principles I.32 (AT VIIIA.17/CSM I.204).
44 Principles I.35 (AT VIIIA.18/CSM I.204–5).
45 Principles I.35 (AT VIIIA.18/CSM I.204–5). But this raises the question of how to read Descartes’s 
comments to Elisabeth, to the effect that we perceive voluntary actions and passions clearly by the 
senses. Perhaps we perceive such things clearly by the senses, but not distinctly (see Principles I.46 for 
an example of this), and therefore while such perceptions are practically necessary they should not 
be taken as true? I aim to explore these questions in a different paper.
46 See his letter to Wittich of 1680 (Raei, Cogitata, 659).
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Ramus and the Ramists . . . take as much trouble to mark the jurisdiction of each 
science and ensure that one does not infringe on another, as is taken in marking the 
boundaries of kingdoms and settling the sovereignty of parliaments.47
But De Raey could hardly be said to have developed a consistent version of Ra-
mism; rather, his sketchy and occasional comments on the appropriate methods 
for the practical sciences leave much to be desired.48 Another difficulty was that 
he struggled to specify the precise demarcation between physics and medicine, 
and to justify the claim that they have nothing at all to do with each other.49 
Despite its problems, however, De Raey managed to acquire for his network’s 
version of Cartesianism, and its accompanying theory of separation, a degree 
of official tolerance and respectability within the universities. He distinguished 
their version of Cartesianism from others that were more radical and generally 
condemned, such as those of Regius and Spinoza.50 His network also worked to 
sustain a united front behind his separation theory. For example, when Velthuysen 
published a work that seemed to apply Cartesian methods to practical political 
questions, Wittich wrote to reprimand him for diverging from the official Dutch 
Cartesian position.51
The separation theory also gained political support. In 1656 the States of Hol-
land, led by Jan De Witt, published the final draft of an edict designed to prevent 
conflict between philosophers and theologians. It stipulated that each group was 
to pursue its science independently and not to get involved in the other’s discus-
sions.52 This was a political victory for the Dutch Cartesians. They had managed 
both to establish their brand of Cartesianism as a philosophy acceptable in the 
universities and to have their views about the separation between philosophy and 
the higher faculties partly reflected by public policy. 
47 Arnauld and Nicole, Logic, or, The Art of Thinking, First Discourse, 12.
48 Verbeek notes that De Raey remained open-minded about what the appropriate methods of the 
higher faculties ought to be—even Aristotelianism might be right. But he was clear that the method 
will not be Cartesian, nor philosophical at all (“Tradition and Novelty,” 194). Also, Descartes himself 
can be interpreted as having exposed the deficiencies of Ramism. Ramus proposed, for example, 
that following true logical method requires one to dispute with others, to “imitate the virtues of the 
greats,” and to study scripture (Dialectique, 159). Yet these humanistic methods seem to come under 
attack in the first part of the Discourse. De Raey, to my knowledge, never successfully demonstrated that 
the latter should be interpreted only as an attack on such methods as applied to philosophy (nothing 
in the Discourse suggests this limitation). For discussion of Descartes’s anti-humanism see Descartes, 
Discours de la méthode. Texte et commentaire par Étienne Gilson. For a discussion of the general influence 
of Ramism during this period see Dibon, La philosophie néerlandaise au siècle d’or. Works exploring the 
links between Ramism and Cartesianism are Bruyère, Méthode et dialectique dans l’œuvre de La Ramée, 
esp. 385–94; Robinet, Aux sources de l’esprit cartésien: l’axe La Ramée-Descartes de la Dialectique de 1555 
aux Regulae. On Ramism and Spinoza, see Cerrato, “The Influence of Pierre de la Ramée at Leiden 
University and on the Intellectual Formation of the Young Spinoza.”
49 Many Cartesians outside De Raey’s network ignored this distinction, especially after 1662, 
when Descartes’s Treatise on Man was published (in a Latin translation by Florent Schuyl); see Verbeek, 
“Cartésiens face à Spinoza,” “Les Passions et la fièvre.”
50 Letter to Wittich, Raei, Cogitata, 660; see also Verbeek, Descartes and the Dutch, 73.
51 Frijhoff, Spies, and Scholz, Dutch Culture in a European Perspective, 324–25.
52 Rowen, John de Witt, 407.
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3 .  s p i n o z a  o n  p h i l o s o p h y  a n d  t h e o l o g y
These politically charged discussions compose the environment in which Spinoza’s 
thoughts on the relation between philosophy and theology developed. Spinoza’s 
exposure to the work of the Dutch Cartesians has been documented by recent 
scholars. It is commonly believed that he attended classes at Leiden University 
from around 1659, where he came into contact with the work of De Raey and 
other prominent members of the Dutch Cartesian network.53 And, as Verbeek 
points out, Spinoza’s
first published work, Principia philosophiæ Renati Des Cartes (1663), was originally writ-
ten for a certain Johannes Casearius (c.1641–1677), who matriculated as a student 
in theology in Leiden in 1661, at a time when De Raey was the only regular profes-
sor of theology. As a result, it seems likely not only that Spinoza was familiar with De 
Raey’s ideas but also that his own work on Descartes’s Principia and even the Tractatus 
de intellectus emendatione can be seen as commentaries on the ideas developed by De 
Raey during his lectures.54
Moreover, Jacob Ostens forwarded a letter he had received from Velthuysen to 
Spinoza and vice-versa in 1671.55 Later the two philosophers corresponded directly.
From the other side, the Dutch Cartesians were, often painfully, aware of 
Spinoza. Verbeek suggests that De Raey’s work in the late 1660s was composed 
in conscious reaction to that of Spinoza and his friend Meijer.56 His reaction was 
largely motivated by the association many people had apparently made between 
Spinoza and Cartesianism, due to the publication of the Principles of Cartesian 
Philosophy in 1663.
The latter work offered an alternative interpretation of Descartes’s philosophy, 
one which, especially in its Appendix, the Metaphysical Thoughts, threatened the 
Dutch Cartesian separation theory. It did so by using Descartes’s metaphysical 
concepts, particularly that of God, to draw out a number of important and far-
reaching theological implications. On Spinoza’s reading, Cartesian philosophy 
could not be kept separate from theology in the way the Dutch Cartesians had 
proposed. It is true that Spinoza sometimes implied that there is a division of 
intellectual labor between theology and philosophy. He left “the theologians to 
decide” whether God could violate his own established laws of nature in order to 
perform miracles.57 He also begged off discussing angels: “For their essence and 
existence are known only through revelation, and so pertain solely to theology.”58 
But these concessions to non-philosophical theology would not have reassured 
the Dutch Cartesians. Purporting to stay entirely within the bounds of Cartesian 
philosophy, the Thoughts discussed God’s various attributes; this is clear from the 
very chapter headings of the second book: “Of God’s Eternity,” “Of the Unity of 
53 Nadler, Spinoza, 191.
54 Verbeek, “Spinoza and Cartesianism,” 175. In fact Spinoza gave lessons on Descartes to Casearius, 
which his friends then requested him to write down and publish. See Letters 8–9 and Meijer’s Preface 
to the Principles of Cartesian Philosophy; see also Nadler, Spinoza, 205–6.
55 Letters 42–43.
56 Verbeek, “Cartésiens face à Spinoza,” 82.
57 Spinoza, Principles of Cartesian Philosophy, II.9, 203.
58 Spinoza, Principles of Cartesian Philosophy, II.12, 208.
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God,” “Of the Immeasurableness of God,” and so forth. These were traditional top-
ics for metaphysics in the tradition defended by Voetius, which, as we saw, placed 
philosophy and theology in a continuum.59 The clear implication of this exercise 
was that Cartesian philosophy had a significant theological application, even if 
there remained some theological questions that lay outside its field of inquiry. 
While the Thoughts did not have a great deal to say about practical theology, it 
became increasingly clear in Spinoza’s following works that he took philosophy to 
have consequences in that domain as well. These were expressed in their mature 
form in the Ethics, a work in which Spinoza drew highly significant ethical and 
political conclusions out of certain metaphysical views concerning the nature of 
God and his relationship with the world. These views, he claimed, teach us 
that we act only from God’s command, that we share in the divine nature, and that 
we do this the more, the more perfect our actions are, and the more and more we 
understand God . . . that we must expect and bear calmly both good fortune and bad 
. . . to hate no one, to disesteem no one, to mock no one, to be angry at no one, to 
envy no one . . . [and] how citizens are to be governed and led, not so that they may 
be slaves, but that they may do freely the things which are best.60 
It is not the purpose of this paper to explain how Spinoza derived these practical 
conclusions from his metaphysical principles. But it is worth noting here that the 
Ethics pursued precisely the chain of reasoning from speculative theological ideas 
to practical consequences that Voetius had claimed to be unavoidable and the 
Dutch Cartesians had claimed to be illegitimate. 
One key reason for this must be that Spinoza rejected the distinction between 
will and intellect, which the Dutch Cartesians needed to uphold their distinction 
between the appropriate methods for true judgment in philosophy on one hand 
and common experience on the other. Voetius had already argued that since will 
and intellect are “mutual causes,” the Dutch Cartesian distinction between philo-
sophical knowledge and common experience cannot hold.61 It is not entirely clear 
what Voetius meant by saying that will and intellect are “mutual causes. ” Taken 
literally, it suggests that they are causes of each other, but something weaker than 
this almost paradoxical notion may be intended. It may mean only that will and 
intellect are so causally intertwined as never to act independently of each other. 
Even if it means only this, it would follow that De Raey’s means of separating 
philosophy from the practical sciences is unlikely to be impracticable. The will 
must be independent of the intellect if it can choose to exercise a different kind 
of judgment depending on whether one is thinking philosophically or practically. 
If the will is not independent of the intellect, it has no such freedom to alter its 
manner of judgment according to the domain of inquiry.
59 Wolfson notes the interesting similarity between the titles of the Metaphysical Thoughts (Cogitata 
Metaphysica) on one hand and of Burgersdijck’s Institutiones Metaphysicæ and Suarez’s Disputationes 
Metaphysicæ on the other (The Philosophy of Spinoza, I.35). Both the latter authors were admired by 
Voetius. But to me the more striking similarity is between the chapter headings of the second book 
of the Thoughts and those of the second book of Burgersdijck’s Institutions. See Burgersdijck, Institu-
tionum Metaphysicarum.
60 Spinoza, Ethics, II.P49.S, II/135–36.
61 Voetius, Disputationes Theologicae Selectae, I.166.
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Spinoza went even further than Voetius, claiming that the will and the intellect, 
beyond being mutual causes are in fact “one and the same.”62 The details of Spi-
noza’s argument and exposition of this doctrine are too complex to be adequately 
tackled in this essay. What is clear is that its implications are radical. As Spinoza 
pointed out, it undermines one common form of belief in the freedom of the will.63 
It also undermines the entire Cartesian theory of judgment.64 Thus he also had 
to reject the Dutch Cartesian distinction between a philosophical and a practical 
way of judging. Indeed, the passage from the Ethics quoted above, concerning the 
practical ramifications of Spinoza’s philosophy, comes directly after a statement 
identifying the will with the intellect.
In the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus (henceforth Tractatus), however, Spinoza 
claimed to separate theology from philosophy, suggesting that he accepted the 
Dutch Cartesian separation thesis in some form. Since this seems to threaten my 
interpretation so far, I shall now turn to this work and suggest a way in which this 
central claim should be interpreted. In the Tractatus, Spinoza often used the word 
‘theology’ as interchangeable with ‘faith’ (fides). He defined the latter as “thinking 
such things about God that if the person is not familiar with them, obedience to 
God is destroyed, and such that, if obedience to God is posited, these beliefs are 
necessarily posited.”65 “Obedience to God” is said to “consist only in Justice and 
Lovingkindness, or [sive] in the love of one’s neighbor.”66 While the word ‘obedi-
ence’ may seem to carry connotations beyond this, such as some idea of submis-
sion to a higher authority, Spinoza failed to include these in his strict definition 
here. Obedience for him appears to consist only [sola] in justice and lovingkind-
ness themselves. Thus, on his view, faith consists of exactly those beliefs that are 
necessary for motivating one to be just and charitable to one’s neighbor. Also, he 
pointed out, this does not require the beliefs in question to be true.67
As we have seen, however, the Ethics provided both ideas about the nature of 
God and ideas about how we can learn to “hate no one, disesteem no one, mock 
no one, be angry at no one, envy no one,” and so on. The latter teaching seems to 
meet Spinoza’s definition of ‘obedience,’ while the former consists of a number of 
beliefs about God. Spinoza did not explicitly suggest that between these two teach-
ings there is the kind of strong entailment described in his definition of faith in 
the Tractatus—that is, that one cannot have the obedience without the beliefs, nor 
the beliefs without the obedience. But it is easy to imagine that, if one is strongly 
committed to a Cartesian-type project of believing nothing except what can be 
rationally justified according to a rigorous standard, one might well end up in a 
position such that obedience is unachievable except by way of the beliefs about 
God systematically demonstrated in the Ethics. And, if one is also keen to follow all 
62 Voluntas, & intellectus unum, & idem sunt (Ethics IIp49c [G II.131]). 
63 Ethics IIp49s.
64 A discussion of the negative implications this doctrine has for the Cartesian theory of judgment 
can be found in last chapter of Verbeek, Spinoza’s Theologico-Political Treatise, esp. 154–55; see also Curley, 
“Descartes, Spinoza and the Ethics of Belief.” 
65 Spinoza, Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, 175.
66 . . . obedientiam in sola Justitia, & Charitate, sive amore erga proximum consistere (G III.177).
67 Faith “does not explicitly require true tenets, but only such tenets as are necessary for obedi-
ence, which strengthen our hearts in love towards our neighbors” (G III.176).
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of one’s beliefs to their logical conclusion, it will happen that one cannot sustain 
such beliefs without seeing the rightness of obedience.
It is clear enough that Spinoza did suppose it possible that somebody could 
end up in such a rigorously intellectualist position. Most of us, he admitted, do 
most of our practical thinking using our imagination, that is, roughly, thinking in 
terms of stories, pictures, feelings, and whatever experiences we happen to have 
had. The more one is able to think in this way, Spinoza contended, the less one is 
able to think using the intellect—using sound philosophical reasoning. But the 
converse is also true. The more one is able to use the intellect the less powerful 
one’s imagination becomes: 
For those who have the most powerful imaginations are less able to grasp things by 
pure intellect. And conversely, those who are more capable in their intellect, and 
who cultivate it most, have a more moderate power of imagining.68
It is at least possible, then, that one could, by increasingly cultivating the intellect, 
come to depend on it almost exclusively. Nor, given the unity of will and intel-
lect discussed above, could one hope—as perhaps De Raey’s ideal philosopher 
would—to develop a robust intellect while retaining the capacity to make practical 
judgments independently of it.69 And so it seems that one could end up in just the 
position described above: holding only those beliefs that meet a rigorous intel-
lectual standard and following them to their logical conclusion.
This makes it seem very much as if in the Ethics Spinoza was trying not simply to 
discover philosophical knowledge, but, more specifically, to discover philosophical 
knowledge that would qualify as faith, that is, knowledge about God that people 
with heavily cultivated intellects will require in order to act with justice and charity. 
This would be a very particular kind of faith, suited only to those capable of com-
mitting to the central project of the Ethics of perfecting oneself through philosophy. 
The Tractatus, by contrast, discusses faith in a broader sense, including those kinds 
more suited to non-philosophers who are led by their imaginations. Nevertheless, 
the proposed separation between theology and philosophy in the Tractatus cannot 
be anywhere near as strong as that proposed by the Dutch Cartesians.
Indeed, it appears that Spinoza’s work was motivated by the urge to respond to 
the Dutch Cartesian denial that philosophy has any relevance to theology or any 
other practically-oriented science. He had shown that philosophy, even philosophy 
in a new Cartesian idiom, was capable of producing metaphysical truths concern-
ing God and the soul—truths that are undoubtedly relevant to theology. That he 
did so in a book that began as lectures for a student of De Raey’s makes it almost 
impossible that he was not aware whom he was confronting in propounding this 
view. The Ethics continued the push against De Raey, showing that the new methods 
68 G III.29.
69 I think that when Spinoza speaks of the “intellect” in the passage in the Ethics where he identifies 
it with will, he does so in a very general sense, which encompasses both of what he calls imagination 
and intellect in the Tractatus (and elsewhere in the Ethics). In refuting the Cartesian claim that the will 
extends further than the intellect, he writes, “I grant that the will extends more widely than the intel-
lect, if by intellect [one] understand[s] only clear and distinct ideas. But I deny that the will extends 
more widely than perceptions, or the faculty of conceiving” (Ethics IIp49s [G II.133]).
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in philosophy render it relevant also to practical theology; it is capable of encourag-
ing what Spinoza calls “faith,” at least for highly intellectual, philosophical types.70
4 .  s p i n o z a ’ s  s e p a r a t i o n  t h e o r y
What, then, are we to make of the claim in the Tractatus that “there is no connection 
or relationship between faith, or Theology, and Philosophy”?71 Spinoza explained 
what he meant by claiming that philosophy and faith pursue different ends: 
“[T]he goal of Philosophy is nothing but the truth, whereas the goal of Faith, as we 
have shown abundantly, is nothing but obedience and piety.”72 For this to entail the 
strong separation between philosophy and theology posited by De Raey, it would 
have to be strictly impossible to achieve the theological goals of obedience and 
piety by pursuing the philosophical goal of truth. But we have seen that Spinoza 
did not believe this to be impossible. As far as piety went, Spinoza was quite clear 
that it could be produced by reason alone, therefore lying entirely within the grasp 
of philosophy.73 And, as we have seen, the philosophical pursuit of truth in the 
Ethics was held to produce a great many ideas that are conducive to obedience. 
Here, however, somebody might contend that I have read too much into Spi-
noza’s strict definition of obedience as consisting only of justice and charity. Really, 
this person might say, Spinoza intended ‘obedience’ to mean submission to a cer-
tain rule or law that mandates justice and charity.74 Alternately, being “obedient” 
might mean specifically practicing justice and charity because revelation shows them 
to be demanded by God, rather than for some other reason, such as for one’s own 
rationally determined good. Indeed, at one point Spinoza claims that “obedience 
is concerned with the will of the one commanding, not with the necessity and truth 
of the matter.”75 Thus, one might hold, pursuing justice and charity following the 
dictates of reason is not obedience. And in that case, perhaps, philosophy cannot 
after all achieve the aims of theology, which include obedience.
But if this is what Spinoza meant, it would seem to follow that the value of 
obedience is entirely instrumental, deriving from the value of justice and charity 
themselves. What good could lie in obedience besides the virtuous feelings and 
70 Voetius implied that traditional philosophy is not only capable of encouraging piety, it is the 
only safeguard of piety: “[O]nce the idea of God and the worship of God is allowed to go from being 
honored and unwounded to being insulted and dishonored, and the principles of natural light and 
rules of all logic and metaphysics are degraded, how shall natural and supernatural theology be re-
stored to their place? Where shall they be sheltered for protection against infidels, fanatics, Sceptics, 
heretics, and libertines?” (Voetius, Disputationes Theologicae Selectae, I.214).
71 G III.179.
72 G III.179.
73 Cupiditatem . . . bene faciendi, quae eo ingeneratur, quod ex rationis ductu vivimus, pietatem voco (Ethics, 
IVp37s). Curley’s translation obscures this point by translating ‘pietas’ as ‘morality’. Perhaps he wants 
to distinguish this pietas from the pietas spoken of in the Tractatus, which is not exclusively engendered 
insofar as we live according to reason. But I would rather say that pietas in general is, for Spinoza, simply 
the desire to act well, and that the Tractatus speaks about pietas in this more general sense, while the 
Ethics speaks of a specific variety of it.
74 One thing that might confirm this objection is the way in which Spinoza suggests at one point 
that the natural light cannot reveal that obedience alone is the way to salvation (G III.188). This is an 
intriguing passage, but it would take me too far afield to comment on it here.
75 G III.198n112.
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behavior it brings about? The fact that a philosopher achieves such virtue as a 
matter of rationality, rather than as a matter of obedience, would only mean that 
rationality has for him or her served the purpose that obedience serves in others.76 
Philosophy therefore could be said to provide by itself all the desiderata that might 
otherwise lead one to pursue theology. If philosophy cannot achieve the specific 
aims of theology, we could say, it can nevertheless achieve the higher aim from 
which theology’s aims derive their entire value.
This means that nothing in Spinoza’s definition of faith, theology, and obedi-
ence  (and nothing he says about the separation between philosophy and theol-
ogy) implies that philosophy cannot in certain cases be faith, in the sense that it 
functions as faith. While the two activities pursue different goals, Spinoza never 
claimed that pursuing nothing but knowledge of the truth necessarily results in 
one’s achieving nothing but the truth. On the contrary, he strongly implied that 
the pursuit of truth can bring practical results alongside knowledge.77 People 
whose pursuit of truth is not very successful may never arrive at those true beliefs 
that also generate obedience (or the practical equivalent of obedience). But the 
Ethics strongly suggests that there are such true beliefs, and that they are within 
the reach of some people. Moreover, the more people arrive at such truths, the 
more they will be motivated to seek more of them. And so while the separation 
between philosophy and theology might hold in many, even most, cases, it need 
not—indeed cannot—hold in the case of a person with a highly cultivated intellect 
and an appreciation for the value of rational understanding.
There are, however, further difficulties for my interpretation. In Chapter Four-
teen of the Tractatus Spinoza listed seven “universal tenets of faith, ” of which he 
claimed, “[I]f any of these tenets is taken away, obedience is also destroyed. ”78 
The problem is that the Ethics seem to contradict many of these tenets, at least 
when the latter are taken literally, suggesting that philosophy gets in the way of the 
beliefs required for obedience rather than producing them. This is a notorious 
problem, which has received a good deal of scholarly attention.79 I do not presume 
to solve it. I shall only reiterate that Spinoza seems quite clearly to have claimed in 
the Ethics that the theological ideas presented there, whether or not they conform 
to the universal tenets, are capable of inspiring just the kinds of moral attitudes 
that he associates with obedience. Therefore they should qualify as faith on his 
earlier definition—or, again, if not as faith then as something capable of achiev-
76 Footnote 34 of the Tractatus, for example, says that when we understand God’s law as eternal 
truth (presumably through reason), “obedience is transformed into love, which flows from true cogni-
tion as surely as light from the sun” (G III.264n34).
77 In my view, the idea that philosophy seeks nothing but truth is, taken literally, plainly false. Phi-
losophers of every kind do not seek any and every truth they are capable of finding out. They seek the 
truths that are in some way significant, even if this means only truths that satisfy their special curiosity. 
But this means they seek something besides mere truth, e.g. the satisfaction of curiosity. For an elabora-
tion of this argument in contemporary terms see Kitcher, “The Ends of the Sciences.”
78 G III.178.
79 Matheron (Le Christ et le salut des ignorants chez Spinoza, 94–127) proposed that all of the tenets 
could be taken as consistent with what is argued for in the Ethics; Daniel Garber (“Should Spinoza 
Have Published His Philosophy?”) disputes Matheron’s reading; Verbeek (Spinoza’s Theologico-Political 
Treatise, 34) takes a similar line to Garber.
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ing precisely the same goals as faith, and to which therefore Spinoza’s functional 
criterion for distinguishing philosophy from faith cannot apply.
This shows that Spinoza’s view of the relation between philosophy and theology 
is in stark contrast to that of the Dutch Cartesians.80 Unlike them, Spinoza did not 
imagine there to be some distinct practical function that philosophy was essen-
tially incapable of serving, a point at which theology and other non-philosophical 
disciplines must take over. He admitted that philosophy and theology are separate 
because they pursue independent goals—understanding on the one hand, obedi-
ence on the other. He held that a person can pursue either goal without pursuing 
the other. He even implied that most people, being predominantly imaginative 
and passionate, are only capable of pursuing the goal of obedience. But despite 
all of this, he maintained that philosophy is, in some cases, capable of advanc-
ing the practical goal of theology simultaneously with advancing its own goal of 
understanding. 
This makes the mutual independence of philosophy and theology far less 
symmetrical than it was for the Dutch Cartesians. It is hard to see how pursuing 
obedience and piety vigorously enough could lead on its own to understanding; 
one can presumably become very just and kind without understanding deep truths 
about the nature of reality (though one must, of course, learn to understand other 
people). But the Ethics makes it possible to see how pursuing understanding can 
sometimes lead to piety and, if not obedience, then at least something that captures 
the whole instrumental value of obedience.
I can think of one more possible objection to this interpretation. While the 
end of Book Two of the Ethics claims that its metaphysical teachings can lead to 
knowledge of moral truths, there is still the question of whether such knowledge 
can, in Spinoza’s words, “move the heart to obedience,”81 that is, whether it can 
actually cause one to act charitably and justly. It is possible that while the philoso-
phy in the Ethics tells us how we ought to act, only the stories in Scripture can 
sufficiently motivate us to act in those ways.82 In this way philosophy might, for 
Spinoza as for the Dutch Cartesians, fail in an important practical function, one 
in which only theology can succeed. 
It is therefore worth looking somewhat more closely at Spinoza’s view about the 
relation between knowledge and motivation. He seemed to believe that knowledge 
of what is good does in itself engender a desire to do good. Nevertheless, he ac-
80 Verbeek (Spinoza’s Theologico-Political Treatise, 114) makes the same point, for slightly different 
reasons. 
81 G III.176.
82 Susan James proposes that Spinoza’s view is that “our principles are made liveable through the 
narratives that make our individual and collective lives intelligible” (“Narrative as the Means to Freedom: 
Spinoza on the Uses of Imagination,” 252). But this is not because he believes that understanding 
is inherently incapable of moving the heart to obedience on its own; rather, it is because “[t]he true 
understanding of the world that reasoning provides is in Spinoza’s view extremely powerful, but it 
is not easy to come by” ( “Narrative as the Means to Freedom: Spinoza on the Uses of Imagination,” 
252). James also acknowledges that Biblical narratives are a uniquely effective but not always neces-
sary source of inspiration to obedience for Spinoza. Moreover, its unique effectiveness is historically 
contingent, or, as she puts it, “the normative properties of Scripture are subject to change” (Spinoza 
on Philosophy, Religion, and Politics: The Theologico-Political Treatise, 124–30).
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knowledged that very often this desire can be overpowered by contrary desires.83 
Thus rational knowledge that justice and charity are good, while sufficient to 
motivate us to act justly and charitably, may not always be sufficient to get us to 
act justly and charitably in the end. 
On the other hand, it is very important that Spinoza’s definition of faith refers 
specifically to beliefs about God.84 Whatever may be said of knowledge of good 
and evil, the knowledge about God presented in the Ethics does seem sufficient 
to determine one to act with charity and justice. At IVp37, for example, we find 
the assertion that “the good which everyone who seeks virtue wants for himself, 
he also desires for other men; and this desire is greater as his knowledge of God is 
greater.” Thus knowledge of God, in proportion to its strength, moves one to act 
in a way that would appear to be a paradigm case of charity: procuring for others 
the good that one wants for oneself.85 Increasing this knowledge increases the 
strength of the accompanying motivation, and Spinoza implies that a sufficient 
degree of knowledge will allow the motivation to overcome any countervailing 
desires and passions.86 
One may again object here that there is a difference between moving the heart 
to obey, as theology seeks to do, and rationally motivating a person to act with 
charity and justice. But, again, the important point is that the practical effects of 
these are the same. Thus a defense of the separation thesis on the grounds that 
philosophy is incapable of moving the heart to obedience and therefore cannot 
serve the practical function of theology will fail. 
There is, of course, a great deal more to be said about this important dimension 
of Spinoza’s ethical and religious thinking.87 But what is clear is that philosophy, 
for Spinoza, is capable of generating beliefs about God—true beliefs, as it hap-
pens—that can serve precisely the same practical ends as theology serves when 
it moves the heart to obedience. It is capable, that is to say, of playing the role of 
theology, while continuing to play its role as philosophy.
5 .  s p i n o z a  v s .  m e i j e r  o n  
s c r i p t u r a l  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n
This is not to say that the distinction Spinoza drew between philosophy and theol-
ogy was not a real and rigorous one. One reason he maintained this distinction 
was to mark the difference between his position and that of Meijer.88 
83 Ethics IV.P17 and its scholium. On this matter see Lin, “Spinoza’s Account of Akrasia.”
84 In fact, his definition of faith may refer to some kind of emotional involvement going beyond 
mere belief. The word he uses is ‘sentire’ (fidei ... sic definiri debet ... quam de Deo talia sentire, quibus 
ignorantis tollitur erga Deum obedientia, & hâc obedientiâ positâ, necessario ponuntur, G III.175). This can 
convey feeling as well as cognitive assent.
85 Again, further on in the Scholium (a passage already quoted) Spinoza claims that “the desire 
to do good” can be “generated in us according to the guidance of reason.” This desire is piety. From 
this definition we might conclude that the relationship between obedience and piety seems to be that 
obedience is a special case of piety: piety is the desire to do good in general, while obedience is the 
desire to treat others with justice and charity—surely a vital part of doing good.
86 Explaining this in detail would take me too far afield here, but see, for example, V.P20.S.
87 Some discussion can be found in De Dijn, “Ethics IV: The ladder, not the top: the provisional 
morals of the philosopher”; Mason, The God of Spinoza: a Philosophical Study; Matheron, Le Christ et le 
salut des ignorants chez Spinoza; and in many other places.
88 Many authors have studied the contrasts between Meijer and Spinoza on this point. Many of 
these propose that Spinoza’s critiques of Maimonides in the TTP are really directed toward Meijer. 
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In his book, Philosophy as the Interpreter of Sacred Scripture, Meijer had argued that 
only philosophy can judge theological matters. In the interpretation of Scripture, 
he asked,
By which faculties should we be led? What helps ought to be favored? By which norm 
and method should we be instructed, in order to be capable of truly explicating 
Sacred Scripture and vindicating it against false interpretations, so that the task of 
an authentic interpretation may be fulfilled?89
The Catholics solve the problem by appealing to the authority of the Church. Those 
outside the Roman faith propose, by contrast, that Scripture itself must provide its 
own norm of interpretation. But in his two previous chapters, Meijer had attempted 
to demonstrate that Scripture is full of inconsistencies and ambiguities, and no 
means of resolving these can be found in the text itself.90 Thus he concluded,
The task [of finding an authentic interpretation] belongs to the true philosophy, 
which is the certain norm that cannot deceive us, both in interpreting the Sacred 
books and in explaining interpretations.91
By ‘philosophy,’ he stressed, he did not mean the ideas of Plato or Aristotle, but 
rather the (unmistakably Cartesian-sounding)
true and totally certain knowledge, free from all prejudices, sustained by the natural 
light and the penetration of the understanding, cultivated and aided by study, appli-
cation, practice, experience, and the use of things, discovered and brought into the 
light of certainty from immutable principles known through themselves and passing to 
their valid consequences and apodictic demonstrations, known clearly and distinctly.92 
This view runs directly contrary to the Dutch Cartesian position. Indeed, it 
necessitates the violation of De Witt’s edict. If the work of philosophers is required 
for the proper interpretation of Scripture, then theologians and philosophers can 
hardly be asked to pursue their own sciences in mutual independence. 
Spinoza, by contrast, insisted on the principle rejected by Meijer, that “all 
knowledge of Scripture must be sought only from Scripture itself” rather than from 
sources external to it, including philosophy.93 This principle of sola scriptura was a 
See, for instance, James, Spinoza on Philosophy, Religion, and Politics, 156–60; Lagrée, “Louis Meyer et la 
Philosophia S. Scripturae Interpretes: Projet cartésien, horizon spinoziste,” “Sense et vérité: Philosophie 
et théologie chez L. Meyer et Spinoza”; Lagrée and Moreau, “La lecture de la Bible dans le cercle de 
Spinoza”; Macherey, “Louis Meyer, interprete de l’Écriture”; Moreau, “Les principes de la lecture de 
l’Ecriture sainte dans le Tractatus Theologico-Politicus”; Zac, Spinoza et l’interprétation de l’Écriture, 27–28.  For 
dissenting views see Klever, “L’erreur de Lambertus van Velthuysen (1622–1685) et des Velthuysiens”; 
Verbeek, Spinoza’s Theologico-Political Treatise, 108. But Verbeek also discusses the difference between 
Meijer’s and Spinoza’s approaches in “L’impossibilité de la théologie: Meyer et Spinoza,” Spinoza’s 
Theologico-Political Treatise, ch.4.
89 Meijer, Philosophia S. Scripturæ Interpres; Exercitio paradoxica in quâ veram Philosophiam infallibilem 
S. Literas interpretandi Norman esse apodictice demonstratur & discrepantes ab hâc sententiæ expendeuntur ac 
refelluntur, V.1, 39.
90 For instance, Meijer points out that whether the meaning of a phrase is clear or obscure is 
subjective—what one person finds clear another finds obscure (Philosophia S. Scripturæ Interpres, III.3, 
7; see also V.1, 31–32).
91 Philosophia S. Scripturæ Interpres, V.1, 40.
92 Philosophia S. Scripturæ Interpres, V.2, 40. Meijer also praises Descartes correctly as the “principal 
founder and propagator of philosophy,” and even rests the hope for an end to church schisms upon 
his philosophy, in the Epilogue.
93 G III.99.
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mainstay of Protestant thinking.94 For instance, the Leiden theologian Antonius 
Waleaus insisted that “Holy Scripture is its own interpreter.”95 Many Reformed 
theologians read this as a repudiation of all attempts to employ philosophy in 
Scriptural exegesis. The British theologian William Ames, who was a professor 
at Franeker from 1622–33, denounced the theology of his colleague Johannes 
Maccovius in Calvinist terms (though Ames was a Quaker). According to Ames, 
Maccovius’s theology, which drew upon Scholastic philosophy, failed to heed Cal-
vin’s contention that the word of God could be understood simply through itself.96 
Maresius used the same argument against Voetius.97 When Voetius appealed to 
human philosophers in order to explain Scripture, he was, Maresius claimed, no 
better than the papists.98 Thus sola scriptura provided a useful way for the Dutch 
Cartesians and others to attack Voetius and his allies, apparently on solid Calvin-
ist principles.99
Spinoza likewise pointed out that rejecting the sola scriptura principle might 
make sense for a Roman Catholic (or, he added, for a Pharisee), but not for any-
body else, thus implicitly rejecting Meijer’s alternative.100 He echoed Ames and 
Maresius in using the principle to oppose those who interpreted Scripture in terms 
of philosophical ideas learned from Plato and Aristotle.101 As he saw it, the great 
breadth of the audiences to which the Prophets and Apostles originally delivered 
the Scriptures (and the common lack of philosophical education among the 
Prophets and Apostles themselves) was enough to show that one need not know 
philosophy in order to understand Scripture.102 But this same argument could be 
applied to refute Meijer, since if the original teachers and students of Scripture 
could not all be expected to have known Plato and Aristotle, they also could not 
all be expected to have mastered Meijer’s sort of philosophy.
By thus embracing the sola scriptura principle in contrast to Meijer, Spinoza was 
aligning his views with those of the Dutch Cartesians, and with other orthodox 
Reformed theologians.  Like them, he believed the interpretation of Scripture 
neither to require philosophy nor to stand to benefit from it. In this sense he did 
believe in the separation of theology and philosophy. On a common Reformed 
understanding of theology, its appropriate method consists entirely of Scriptural 
exegesis; De Raey insisted, for instance, that “theology is simply treated by Scrip-
ture, that which speaks of God, that is, the works of God.”103 If it is true, as Spinoza 
94 However, Spinoza’s further claim, that reason or the natural light alone is necessary for in-
terpreting Scripture was far more radical in this context. On this see, for instance, James, Spinoza on 
Philosophy, Religion, and Politics, ch.6.
95 Walaeus, Enchiridium religionis reformatae, 1; quoted in Verbeek, Spinoza’s Theologico-Political 
Treatise, 94.
96 Verbeek, Descartes and the Dutch, 7; see, for instance, Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion., I.vii.4.
97 Verbeek, Descartes and the Dutch, 7.
98 Descartes and the Dutch, 7.
99 Voetius’s relation to the sola scriptura principle was more complex than this brief discussion 
might suggest; see Verbeek, “Descartes and the Problem of Atheism” and Spinoza’s Theologico-Political 
Treatise, 94–95. 
100 G III.105.
101 G III.9, 19, 167–68.
102 G III.114, 167.
103 Raei, Cogitata, 657.
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held, that Scriptural exegesis requires no philosophical inquiry, then philosophy 
and theology can be held to be independent of each other. 
On the other hand, as we have seen, Spinoza did not quite understand theol-
ogy in this way. While his separation claim applied perfectly to theology as De 
Raey defined it, his own definition allowed that in some special cases philosophy 
could achieve everything theologians seek to achieve through the interpretation 
of Scripture—that is, arriving at beliefs capable of promoting justice and charity. 
Philosophy could do this not by providing a norm for interpreting Scripture, as 
Meijer had proposed, but rather independently of Scripture altogether.104 Spi-
noza’s position was less radical than Meijer’s, since he conceded that in most cases 
theologians, in the standard sense, could do their work without any help from 
philosophy at all.105 But it was more radical than that of the Dutch Cartesians, 
since he implied that in the case of highly intellectual, philosophical types, the 
true business of theology would in fact be fully attended to by philosophy.106 And 
since he defined theology purely in terms of its aims, this really amounted to the 
claim that philosophy can, in certain cases, be theology.
6 .  c o n c l u s i o n
Spinoza developed his views on theology and philosophy as an alternative strategy 
to the one the Dutch Cartesians on the one hand and Meijer on the other had 
adopted in order to face off the accusations of people like Voetius.107 As Voetius 
saw it, the new philosophy was a device for propounding unorthodox theological 
views. The Dutch Cartesians contended that philosophy could not propound any 
theological views; it is categorically incapable of penetrating into matters of theol-
ogy, or indeed into matters of practical importance more generally. Meijer’s much 
more radical claim was that philosophy provides the only standard against which 
104 Meijer himself admitted to having implied that, since philosophy is alone the source of truth, 
Scripture might not be strictly necessary at all. Rather than directly denying this implication, he tried 
to temper it with the claim that Scripture nevertheless plays a vital role in guiding us “to think upon 
the things of which it speaks, to look into them, and to examine whether they are as it proposes them 
to be” (Philosophia S. Scripturæ Interpres, Epilogue, P2 [collating figure given, since there are no page 
numbers]). The problem is that he failed to make it clear whether this means that Scripture is abso-
lutely necessary for salvation or only a very useful tool. Some, such as Nadler, read him as claiming 
unambiguously that Scripture is strictly unnecessary (A Book Forged in Hell, 124). But this is far from 
being explicitly stated in Meijer’s text. Spinoza for his part is convinced that if philosophical reason 
were the only source of obedience “we would doubt nearly everyone’s salvation” (G III.188).
105 However, it is worth noting that while Spinoza disagreed with Meijer about whether the content 
of philosophy was necessary for the interpretation of Scripture, he may have agreed with him that the 
methods of philosophy (or at least those characteristically associated with philosophy) are necessary for 
interpretation; see James, Spinoza on Philosophy, Religion, and Politics, 160.
106 On Spinoza’s argument that “[n]atural reason can . . . make the Bible dispensable,” see Spinoza 
on Philosophy, Religion, and Politics, 124–30.
107 An entirely different line of response, a fascinating one that I have unfortunately not had room 
to discuss here, is that taken by the Belgian philosopher Arnold Geulincx (1624–69). Very roughly, 
Geulincx argued that philosophy could successfully provide moral and spiritual guidance, and that it 
could do so on its own, unaided by revelation, but that it could only do so after revelation had taken 
place; see Geulincx, Ethics. On the relation between Geulincx and Spinoza, see Aalderink, “Spinoza 
and Geulincx on the Human Condition, Passions, and Love”; Rousset, Geulincx entre Descartes et Spinoza; 
Ruler, “Geulincx and Spinoza: Books, Backgrounds and Biographies.” 
586 journal of the history of philosophy 51:4  October 2013
theological claims can be judged, since only philosophy can interpret Scripture. 
But Spinoza held a third position, distinct from both of these and in some ways 
in between them. It was that philosophy, while fully separate from the activity of 
Scriptural interpretation, is in some special cases capable of independently play-
ing the practical role of theology. 
Perhaps Spinoza was trying to capitalize on the success the Dutch Cartesians 
had had in making their philosophy officially tolerated.108 In most cases, in Spi-
noza’s view, the Dutch Cartesians were right that philosophy cannot achieve the 
same practical ends as theology. In most cases, Meijer was wrong to suppose that 
philosophy had any role to play in advancing the aims of theology. It is only in the 
case of a very rare type of highly intellectual person that philosophy can achieve 
the ends of theology.109 Perhaps Spinoza thought it should follow that, given the 
rarity of these special cases, his position should be regarded as being as innocuous 
as that of the Dutch Cartesians. Their view was that philosophy is always irrelevant 
to theology. His view was that philosophy is almost always irrelevant to it. 
But Spinoza’s view, even had it been accepted, might not have been enough 
to make religious and political leaders relaxed about the practice of philosophy. 
If philosophical ideas can have practical implications at all, then the possibility 
remains that even if the truest philosophy brings about justice and charity, defec-
tive forms of philosophy might bring about licentiousness and impiety.110 How 
can one guarantee that once it is accepted that philosophy can have practical 
consequences, only good philosophy will be produced? 
At any rate it seems there is much to be gained from understanding Spinoza’s 
views on philosophy and theology as having been formed in conscious response 
to the Dutch Cartesians.
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